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NOTE 
269 
Keep It Real:  A Call For a Broader 
Quality Control Requirement in 
Trademark Law 
Noah D. Genel*  
INTRODUCTION 
Jim rolls out of bed, stumbles into the bathroom, applies shav-
ing cream to his face, and picks up his new ShaveCorp brand 
Smooth-Glide razor—the one that is advertised for its ability to 
make shaving the smoothest part of your morning.  But the first ra-
zor stroke across Jim’s face produces a sharp stinging sensation 
and draws blood.  With the blood streaming down his cheek, Jim 
thinks this shave is just too close for comfort! 
ShaveCorp responds to Jim’s subsequent complaint by refer-
ring him to the Canadian licensee that manufactures the blades un-
der ShaveCorp’s Smooth-Glide trademark.  But ShaveCorp cannot 
shrug off responsibility so easily; the company risks the loss of 
trademark protection for failing to adequately police the quality of 
its licensed Smooth-Glide razor blades.1  Ironically, ShaveCorp 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Fordham University School of Law.  The author gratefully 
acknowledges the insight, support, and friendship of Professor Hugh C. Hansen, Ford-
ham University School of Law, in the preparation of this Note.  This Note is lovingly 
dedicated to my parents, Jeffrey and Regina, who inspire me to reach for my goals. 
1. See BEVERLY PATTISHALL, ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4.05 
(2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter PATTISHALL, TRADEMARKS] (“In the absence of real and effec-
tive control by the licensor the trademark will no longer symbolize a particular source [of 
goods] and the licensor may no longer have a protectable interest in the trademark.”); see 
also Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc. 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959) 
(“[T]he Lanham Act places an affirmative duty upon a licensor of a registered trademark 
to detect and prevent misleading uses of his mark by his licensees or suffer cancellation 
of his federal registration) (citing Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 
427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1997))); see, e.g., C.B. Fleet 
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would not have risked the same type of trademark damage had it 
manufactured and sold dull razor blades on its own.2  There lies the 
strange dichotomy in the doctrine of trademark quality control. 
The quality control requirement is a well-established doctrine 
of trademark assignment and licensing.3  The quality control rule 
stems from the notion that brands are more than mere indicators of 
source, as they were originally viewed.4  Modern courts and com-
mentators recognize that trademarks identify both the source and 
the quality of the products or services to which they are affixed.5  
 
Co. v. Complete Packaging Corp., 739 F.Supp. 393, 395-96 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (illustrating 
a comprehensive set of quality control procedures established by the licensor of a trade-
mark); see also infra Parts I.D.1, I.D.2 (setting forth the rules against assignment in gross 
and naked licensing of trademarks). 
2. See PATTISHALL, TRADEMARKS, supra note 1, § 4.05, at 164-69 (explaining that 
the quality control requirement eases the deceptive consequences of trademark licens-
ing).  Because trademark licensing, in effect, misleads the public as to the source of 
goods, the quality control requirement insures that such de facto deception does not work 
a harmful effect on the public.  See id.; see also Helene Curtis v. National Wholesale 
Liquidators, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 152, 157 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that goods must meet 
the trademark owner’s quality control standards to be considered genuine goods, other-
wise “their sale will constitute trademark infringement”) (quoting Polymer Tech. Corp. v. 
Mimran, 37 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir 1994)); see also, e.g., C.B. Fleet Co. 739 F.Supp. at 398-
99 (enjoining further use of a licensed trademark following product contamination be-
cause consumers would buy the licensed products in the erroneous belief that they had 
been manufactured under the control of the trademark owner); cf. Burger King Corp. v. 
Stephens, T.L.C.S., Inc., No. CIV-A 89-7691, 1989 WL 147557 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 1989) 
(recognizing the risk of physical harm to consumers in a case involving subversion of 
quality standards in a fast-food franchise). 
3. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 6 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(discussing how fluctuation of the quality of a product can result in tarnishment of the 
trademark under which the product is marketed); Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, 
Inc., 928 F.2d 104, 107 (4th Cir. 1991) (affirming District Court’s finding that quality 
control standards are an “integral part” of a trademark); El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. 
Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that goods marketed un-
der a trademark but not produced under the trademark holder’s quality controls were not 
“genuine” goods for purposes of trademark law). 
4. See Ethan Horwitz & Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act: A Retro-
spective of Section 43(a), 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59, 60-61 & nn.4, 
5 (1996) (noting trademark’s origins in the common-law tort of deceit and the law of un-
fair competition); Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 
HARV. L. REV. 813, 813-19 (1927) (discussing the evolution of the modern trademark). 
5. See Schechter, supra note 4; see also Polymer Tech., 37 F.3d at 78 (explaining 
that “trademark law . . . serves to guarantee the quality of the trademarked product”) 
(quoting Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 75 
(2d Cir. 1987) (Cardamone, J., concurring)). 
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Accordingly, trademark law imposes a requirement on trademark 
licensors and assignors to control the quality of the products pro-
duced under their brand names by licensees and assignees.6  This 
rule guarantees that licensed products are genuine7 and that they 
maintain their integrity.8 
Ensuring that only genuine products reach the market perpetu-
ates goodwill.9  Without a quality control requirement, a trademark 
license might divorce the mark from its goodwill because the 
products produced by the unsupervised licensee would likely fall 
below the brand owner’s quality controls.10  Thus, consumers who 
purchase non-genuine goods, relying on the mark’s goodwill, 
would be deceived.11 
Today, courts apply the quality control requirement not to all 
 
6. See TMT North Am., Inc. v. Magic Touch GmbH, 124 F.3d 876, 885 (7th Cir. 
1997) (stating that “[i]f a trademark owner allows licensees to depart from its quality 
standards, the public will be misled, and the trademark will cease to have utility as an 
informational device”); Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113 (5th 
Cir. 1991) (explaining that “[t]he purpose of the quality control requirement is to prevent 
the public deception that would ensue from variant quality standards under the same 
mark or dress”), cert. granted in part, 502 U.S. 1071, aff’d, 505 U.S. 1071 (1992). 
7. Genuine goods are products made and distributed under the trademark owner’s 
quality controls.  See Polymer Tech., 37 F.3d at 78 (stating that “[g]oods . . . that do not 
meet the trademark owner’s quality control standards will not be considered genuine 
goods, and their sale will constitute trademark infringement”). 
8. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:55 
(4th ed. 1996) (stating that “customers are entitled to assume that the nature and quality 
of goods and services sold under the mark at all licensed outlets will be consistent and 
predictable”). 
9. Goodwill is defined as “[p]roperty of an intangible nature, commonly defined as 
the expectation of continued patronage.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 694 (6th ed. 1990); 
see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 2:17 (stating that goodwill “is a business value 
that reflects the basic human propensity to continue doing business with a seller who has 
offered goods and services that the customer likes and has found adequate to fulfill his 
needs”). 
Although this Note spells the term “goodwill” as one word, several of the authorities 
quoted herein use the term as two words: “good will.” 
10. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:2 (explaining that “[g]oodwill and its 
trademark symbol are as inseparable as Siamese Twins who cannot be separated without 
death to both”). 
11. See id. § 18:3 (stating that “[u]se of a mark . . . in connection with a different 
goodwill and different product may result in a fraud on the purchasing public, who rea-
sonably assume that the mark signifies the same nature and quality of goods or ser-
vices”). 
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trademark owners, but only to those who either assign or license 
their marks.12  Nevertheless, courts are slowly broadening the doc-
trine in the recognition that consumers use brands to tell them ex-
actly what products they are about to purchase, rather than to indi-
cate merely the source and quality of those goods.13 
Although the law is expanding in this area, the quality control 
requirement remains an under-used doctrine.14  Its critics argue 
that it serves no important purpose and should be discarded.15  Its 
proponents, however, argue that the requirement protects the es-
sence of the trademark itself.16  The scope of the quality control 
requirement thus remains an open issue.17 
This Note asserts that the quality control requirement should 
apply to all trademark owners, regardless of whether or not they 
assign or license their marks.  Part I recounts the history of the 
quality control requirement.  Part II discusses the differing views 
regarding the utility of the doctrine and analyzes cases in which 
courts have and have not enforced the requirement.  Part III argues 
that the quality control requirement would effectively preserve 
public trust in the trademark system if it were expanded to apply to 
all trademark owners.  This Note concludes that courts should ap-
ply the quality control doctrine equally to every trademark holder. 
 
12. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing how courts currently apply 
the quality control requirement). 
13. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 6-8 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(applying the quality control requirement to wholesalers of trademarked goods); Shell 
Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104, 107-08 (4th Cir. 1991) (same); see 
also infra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2 (analyzing Warner-Lambert and Shell Oil). 
14. See infra Part II (discussing the conflict over the proper application of the qual-
ity control requirement). 
15. See Kevin Parks, “Naked” Is Not a Four Letter Word: Debunking the Myth of 
the “Quality Control Requirement” in Trademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531, 
568-69 (1992). 
16. See Elmer William Hanak, III, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks, 
43 FORDHAM L. REV. 363, 363-64 (1974) (stating that “one can make the argument that 
in the world of modern marketing the primary function of a trademark is to indicate de-
gree of quality”). 
17. See infra Part II (setting forth the debate over the proper application of the qual-
ity control requirement). 
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I. HISTORY OF THE QUALITY CONTROL REQUIREMENT 
The Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”)18 defines a 
trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combina-
tion thereof [used or intended to be used by a person] in com-
merce . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from 
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of 
the goods, even if that source is unknown.”19  This definition is 
consonant with the traditional view of trademarks as indicators of 
source.20 
The definition has sparked great debate in its application as 
trademark theorists argue over whether brands serve merely as 
source indicators or whether they also represent a level of product 
quality that a consumer can expect to receive upon purchasing an 
item.21  This part examines the history and purposes of the quality 
control requirement in trademark law and explains how a trade-
mark owner’s neglect of quality control can cause an abandonment 
of the mark. 
A. The Trademark as an Indicator of Source 
Courts and commentators always have viewed trademarks as 
indicators of source.22  The modern trademark is rooted in the 
“regulatory production mark,” which manufacturers were required 
by law to affix to their products in order to allow consumers to 
trace defective craftsmanship back to its source.23 
The ancestor of the modern trademark protected consumers by 
enabling them to police the marketplace and by giving them a 
 
18. Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1997)). 
19. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1997). 
20. See infra note 22 and accompanying text (explaining the traditional view of the 
function of trademarks). 
21. Compare Parks, supra note 15, at 531-36 (arguing that trademarks do not 
“guarantee” the quality of the goods to which they are affixed), with Hanak, supra note 
16, at 363 (stating that “[t]oday virtually every writer on trademark law accepts the qual-
ity assurance function”). 
22. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916) (finding that 
a mark’s purpose is “to identify the origin or ownership of the goods to which it is af-
fixed”). 
23. Schechter, supra note 4, at 814. 
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means of seeking redress if they purchased a sub-quality product.24  
Source identifiers not only allow purchasers to quickly identify 
goods, they also insure that manufacturers are accountable to con-
sumers for any substandard products.25  The desire for manufac-
turer accountability led to the emergence of the quality-indicator 
function of trademarks.26 
B. The Trademark as an Indicator of Quality 
Almost all trademark theorists define trademarks as indicators 
of a product’s source and as guarantors of its quality.27  In this 
manner, brands enable owners to create goodwill.28  Goodwill pro-
vides consumers with the ability to easily relocate and repurchase a 
certain product based on its brand name.29  Requiring brand own-
ers to maintain consistent product quality strengthens goodwill and 
builds consumer trust in the entire trademark system.30  Conse-
quently, the quality control requirement allows consumers to rely 
on trademarks as indicators of exactly what they are about to pur-
chase, instead of merely who produced it.31 
 
24. See id. 
25. See id. 
26. See id. at 819 (stating that “today the trademark is not merely the symbol of 
goodwill, but often the most effective agent for the creation of goodwill imprinting upon 
the public mind an anonymous and impersonal guarantee of satisfaction”).  The mark can 
only guarantee satisfaction with a product if it accurately conveys the nature of the prod-
uct to the consumer; the quality of the item is an integral aspect of the product.  See Ha-
nak, supra note 16, at 364 (stating that consumers rarely know or care about the exact 
source of the products they buy). 
27. See id. at 363 (asserting that “virtually every writer on trademark law accepts 
the quality assurance function”); see also Schechter, supra note 4, at 818 (stating that 
“[t]he true functions of the trademark are . . . to identify a product as satisfactory and 
thereby to stimulate further purchases by the consuming public”).  Professor Schechter’s 
theory shows that trademarks are symbols of goodwill.  See discussion supra note 9 (de-
fining “goodwill”).  But see Parks, supra note 15, at 532 (arguing that trademarks do not 
serve to guarantee the quality of a product). 
28. See Schechter, supra note 4, at 818 (“To describe a trademark merely as a sym-
bol of goodwill, without recognizing in it an agency for the actual creation and perpetua-
tion of goodwill, ignores the most potent aspect of the nature of a trademark and that 
phase most in need of protection.”). 
29. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (defining “goodwill”). 
30. See Schechter, supra note 4, at 819 (stating that trademarks are the “most effec-
tive agent[s] for the creation of goodwill”). 
31. See Hanak, supra note 16, at 364.  According to Hanak, consumers are con-
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C. Neglect of Quality Control Is Abandonment 
Section 45 of the Lanham Act states that a trademark will be 
deemed to be abandoned if the owner (1) discontinues using the 
mark with the intent never to resume using it, (2) causes its mark 
to become the generic name for the item to which the mark is af-
fixed, or (3) causes its mark to lose its significance as a trade-
mark.32  In interpreting this definition, courts have ruled that 
trademark assignors and licensors abandon their marks when they 
fail to establish and monitor quality controls to which their assign-
ees or licensees must adhere.33 
Failure to supervise the manufacturing process of a product 
causes its quality to fluctuate, thus consumers cannot rely on its 
trademark to indicate exactly what they are buying.34  As a result, 
the brand loses its significance in the marketplace, and the mark 
holder violates the third principle of the definition of abandonment 
in the Lanham Act.35 
1. The Rule Against Assignment in Gross 
The owner of a trademark may assign the right to use the mark 
to a third party.36  The law requires, however, that any assignment 
also include the goodwill in the mark.37  Trademarks enable sellers 
 
cerned about their ability to use trademarks as a personal measure of quality.  Id. (“In 
short, a consumer wishes to match a trademark with what he likes and dislikes.  If the 
origin of a product is of concern to a consumer, it is only because the manufacturer’s 
products have come to be associated with a certain level of quality.”). 
32. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1997). 
33. See infra Parts I.C.1, I.C.2 (setting forth the rules against assignment in gross 
and naked licensing). 
34. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:55 (describing the requirement for consis-
tent quality in trademarked goods). 
35. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127. 
36. See Clark & Freeman Corp. v. Heartland Co., 811 F. Supp. 137, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (“Generally, an assignment of a trademark and its accompanying goodwill will 
entitle the assignee to step into the shoes of the assignor.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
37. Id. (quoting Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984)).  According 
to the Marshak court, the “[u]se of the mark by the assignee in connection with a differ-
ent goodwill and different product would result in a fraud on the purchasing public who 
reasonably assume that the mark signifies the same thing, whether used by one person or 
another.”  Marshak, 746 F.2d at 929. 
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to market their goods by affixing names to them.38  Consumers 
sample a product and, if they like it, they can quickly find it again 
through recognition of the trademark.39  As consumers repeatedly 
purchase the item, its mark gains goodwill and, in the language of 
trademarks, grows in strength.40  Thus, strong marks reduce con-
sumer search costs by immediately identifying what products buy-
ers will receive when they rely on the goodwill in those brands.41  
When a trademark owner separates its mark from the goodwill in 
that mark, for example by assigning the right to use the brand 
name without establishing provisions for the simultaneous transfer 
of the mark’s goodwill, search costs rise because the brand no 
longer necessarily represents the true nature of the items sold un-
der that name.42 
Section 10 of the Lanham Act states that “[a] registered mark 
or a mark for which application to register has been filed shall be 
assignable with the goodwill of the business in which the mark is 
used.”43  The reason behind this limitation, according to Professor 
McCarthy, is that “a trademark is merely a symbol of goodwill.”44  
 
38. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 3:2.  Professor McCarthy explains that 
trademarks perform four basic functions: 
1. To identify one seller’s goods and distinguish them from goods sold by oth-
ers; 
2. To signify that all goods bearing the trademark come from or are controlled 
by a single, albeit anonymous, source; 
3. To signify that all goods bearing the trademark are of an equal level of qual-
ity; and 
4. As a prime instrument in advertising and selling the goods. 
Id. 
39. See id. (“Without the identification function performed by trademarks, buyers 
would have no way of returning to buy products that they have used and liked.”). 
40. See id. (“If this consumer satisfaction and preference is labeled ‘goodwill,’ then 
a trademark is the symbol by which the world can identify that goodwill.”). 
41. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-70 (1987) (arguing that trademarks perform an 
“economizing function” by making goods easily identifiable using unique names at-
tached to each item).  Professor Landes and Judge Posner write that “[t]he value of a 
trademark is the saving in [consumer] search costs made possible by the information or 
reputation that the trademark conveys or embodies about the brand.”  Id. at 270. 
42. See id. 
43. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1060 (West 1997). 
44. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:2. 
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If the mark loses that goodwill, it is worthless.45  After an assign-
ment in gross, “the assignee obtains the symbol, but not the real-
ity.”46  Trademark law, therefore, forbids a brand owner from as-
signing its mark to another party without simultaneously 
conveying its goodwill.47  Such an assignment would deceive con-
sumers who rely on the brand’s goodwill because the purchased 
items would differ from what they expected to receive, due to the 
original brand owner’s lack of input in the manufacturing proc-
ess.48 
Consistency of product quality effectively promotes repeat pur-
chasing and strengthens goodwill49—even where products are of a 
lesser, rather than higher caliber.50  Consumers become repeat buy-
ers after enjoying a favorable experience with a product, and they 
expect the product’s quality to remain consistent.51  In this manner, 
repeat purchasing indicates consumer satisfaction with the quality 
of the product.52  The rule against assignment in gross protects 
consumers by requiring a trademark assignor to monitor its 
assignee, insuring that the products the assignee produces retain 
their pre-assignment quality level.53  The consumer can thus be 
 
45. See DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1936) 
(holding that the word “cellophane” has become generic to most people, hence signifies 
only the product, not the source or quality of that product). 
46. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:3. 
47. See discussion supra note 37 (describing the connection between trademarks 
and goodwill). 
48. See Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984). 
49. See Landes & Posner, supra note 41, at 270.  Professor Landes and Judge Pos-
ner assert that “[o]nce the reputation [of a brand] is created, the [owner of the mark] will 
obtain greater profits because repeat purchases and word-of-mouth references will gener-
ate higher sales and because consumers will be willing to pay higher prices for lower 
search costs and greater assurance of consistent quality.”  Id. 
50. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 3:10 (explaining that “the quality function of 
marks does not mean that marks always signify ‘high’ quality goods or services -– 
merely that the quality level, whatever it is, will remain consistent and predictable among 
all goods or services supplied under the mark”). 
51. See id. 
52. See Landes & Posner, supra note 41, at 270 (“Creating . . . a reputation requires 
expenditures on product quality.”). 
53. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 3:11 (stating that “it is clear that trademark 
law permits the licensing of a mark under any circumstances where the licensor exercises 
quality control over goods and services that reach the customer under the licensed 
mark”). 
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confident that what he buys will meet his expectations.54 
Professor McCarthy explains that “[t]he situation sought to be 
avoided [by outlawing assignments in gross] is customer deception 
resulting from abrupt and radical changes in the nature and quality 
of the goods or services after assignment of the mark.”55  Assign-
ment in gross is a fraud on the public.56  The only way to avoid this 
consumer deception is to force the assignor to transfer the goodwill 
in the trademark to its assignee, including the level of product 
quality.57 
2. The Rule Against Naked Licensing 
Section 5 of the Lanham Act, entitled “Use by Related Compa-
nies,” authorizes trademark owners to license their marks to other 
companies in the same field of business.58  The provision contains 
three restrictions, (1) that the licensee be a “related company,” (2) 
that the mark not be used in a manner that will deceive the public, 
and (3) that the owner monitor its licensee with respect to the “na-
ture and quality” of the goods or services that the licensee pro-
duces.59  This rule, permitting the licensing of trademarks, reflects 
a change from the law’s original treatment of trademarks.60 
As the law first developed, courts viewed trademarks as repre-
senting only the actual physical source of the product to which 
they were affixed.61  This outlook is now known as the “source 
 
54. See id. § 3:10 (indicating that trademarks send a message to consumers that they 
can expect to receive goods of consistent quality). 
55. Id. § 18:10. 
56. See id. § 18:3 (“Use of the mark by the assignee in connection with a different 
goodwill and different product may result in a fraud on the purchasing public.”). 
57. See id. 
58. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1055 (West 1997); see also Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food 
Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding that the “Lanham Act clearly car-
ries forward the view . . . that controlled licensing does not work an abandonment of the 
licensor’s registration, while a system of naked licensing does”). 
59. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1055. 
60. See Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 366 (recounting that “[p]rior to the passage of the 
Lanham Act, many courts took the position that the licensing of a trademark separately 
from the business in connection with which it had been used worked an abandonment,” 
regardless of whether or not the license contained provisions by which the licensor could 
control the quality of the licensee’s product). 
61. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:39. 
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theory” because it treats trademarks as nothing more than indica-
tors of source.62  In the 1930s, however, theorists developed the 
“quality theory” of trademarks,63 in which brands serve the dual 
role of indicating both the source and quality of products and ser-
vices.64  Professor McCarthy states that “the consumer assumes 
that products sold under the same trademark will be of equal qual-
ity regardless of the actual physical source or producer of the 
goods.”65 
Professor McCarthy highlights the fact that the source theory 
does not adequately account for the way consumers use trade-
marks.66  The average shopper wants to know what product he is 
purchasing, not the exact identity of the manufacturer.67  Section 5 
of the Lanham Act68 recognizes this reality by authorizing a trade-
mark owner to license its mark subject to the condition that the li-
censor maintain control of both the nature and quality of the prod-
ucts marketed under that trademark.69 
Because a brand’s goodwill sends a message to the consumer 
that he will have the same experience with the product today as he 
had in the past,70 the brand’s message is false if its owner does not 
retain control over the quality of the products sold under the mark.  
Such goods are not genuine.71  The effects of a trademark owner’s 
 
62. See supra Part I.A (discussing how trademarks act as indicators of source). 
63. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:40. 
64. See supra Part I.B (discussing the quality indicator function of trademarks). 
65. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:40. 
66. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 3:10 (indicating that trademarks simultane-
ously indicate both the source and quality of a product or service). 
67. See id. § 3:9 (stating that the “source function was gradually softened by the 
courts to mean that the consumer expected all goods with the same mark to come from a 
single, but anonymous or indistinguishable, source”). 
68. 15 U.S.C.A. 1055 (West 1997). 
69. See id. §§ 1055, 1127. 
70. See supra notes 9, 28-30 and accompanying text (defining goodwill and dis-
cussing its utility); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 3:10 (asserting that trademarks 
indicate consistency in quality). 
71. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:42 (stating that a product is “genuine” 
only if it has been “manufactured and distributed under controls established by the manu-
facturer”); see also Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 
1991) (“[I]n order to maintain the genuineness of the bulk oil, the quality control stan-
dards must be controlled by [the brand’s owner].”); El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe 
World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1987) (ruling that the shoes manufactured by 
GENEL.TYP 9/29/2006  4:47 PM 
280 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:269 
lack of control over the quality of the goods sold under his brand 
name, therefore, are potentially devastating to the entire system of 
trademarks.72 
3. The Introduction of the Quality Control Requirement to 
Trademark Law 
In Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc.,73 the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals became the first court to apply the quality 
control requirement.  In Dawn Donut, the court held that the Lan-
ham Act permits a trademark owner to license its mark as long as 
that owner retains control over the quality of the goods its licensee 
sends into the market.74  If the owner fails to exercise such control, 
it will be deemed to have abandoned its mark.75 
The theory behind the rule in Dawn Donut is that naked licens-
ing “create[s] the danger that products bearing the same trademark 
might be of diverse qualities.”76  Consumers are deceived when 
they purchase a product believing it to be of one quality, and it 
turns out to be different.77  Although the market eventually may 
punish naked licensors through decreased sales of their products, 
consumers will be misled repeatedly during the period of market 
adjustment.78  Congress, therefore, sought to prevent consumer de-
ception entirely by promulgating the Lanham Act.79  Courts use 
 
the defendant were not genuine because the trademark owner was not given an opportu-
nity to inspect them prior to distribution).  “The mere act of ordering a product to be la-
beled with a trademark does not deprive its holder of the right to control the product and 
the trademark.”  Id. at 395-96. 
72. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 3:10 (asserting that “few harms are more cor-
rosive in the marketplace than the inability of a trademark holder to control the quality of 
bogus articles thought (erroneously) to derive from it”) (quoting Hypertherm, Inc. v. Pre-
cision Prods., Inc., 832 F.2d 697, 700 (1st Cir. 1987)). 
73. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). 
74. See id. at 367. 
75. See id. 
76. Id. (citing American Broadcasting Co. v. Wahl Co., 121 F.2d 412, 413 (2d Cir. 
1941); Everett O. Fisk & Co. v. First Teachers’ Agency, Inc., 3 F.2d 7, 9 (8th Cir. 
1924)). 
77. See id. (“If the licensor is not compelled to take some reasonable steps to pre-
vent misuses of his trademark in the hands of others, the public will be deprived of its 
most effective protection against misleading uses of a trademark.”). 
78. See id. 
79. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1-2 (1946) (stating that the Lanham Act “has as its 
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that legislation to strip naked licensors of all protection for their 
marks.80  They rule that any licensed trademark that does not per-
form its function as a quality indicator has been abandoned by its 
owner, the licensor.81 
II. THE DEBATE OVER THE PROPER APPLICATION OF THE QUALITY 
CONTROL REQUIREMENT 
The proper application of the quality control requirement is an 
issue that has sparked great debate.82  Kevin Parks, a critic of the 
quality control requirement, argues that the quality assurance the-
ory of trademark law is useless.83  He hypothesizes that “[n]ever 
would so significant a ‘change’ in the law of trademarks come so 
quietly into being as when the quality theory of trademarks was 
recognized for what it is—an anachronism.”84  This view is in 
stark contrast to that of proponents of the quality control require-
ment, who believe that quality assurance is the primary purpose of 
trademarks.85  Although trademark theorists have made strong ar-
guments on both sides of this issue, neither Congress nor the courts 
have definitively resolved the question of how broad the quality 
control requirement should be or whether it should exist at all. 
This part sets forth the conflict over the correct application of 
the quality control requirement—analyzing the manner in which 
the debate is fueled by the divergent approaches of courts, some of 
 
objective the protection of trademarks, securing to the owner the goodwill of his business 
and protecting the public against spurious and falsely marketed goods”). 
80. See Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that naked licensing is “inherently deceptive and constitutes abandonment of any 
rights to the trademark by the licensor”); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified 
Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that a trademark owner 
loses the right to use the mark when he allows the mark to lose its utility as an informa-
tional device for consumers through uncontrolled licensing). 
81. See SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAW: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 153, 156 
(2d ed. 1991) (arguing that abandonment is an “affirmative defense” which will preclude 
a plaintiff’s recovery). 
82. See generally Parks, supra note 15, at 531-68 (challenging the validity of the 
quality control requirement). 
83. Id. at 569. 
84. Id. 
85. See Hanak, supra note 16, at 363-64 (contending that “one can readily make the 
argument that in the world of modern marketing the primary function of a trademark is to 
indicate degree of quality, and only secondarily to indicate origin or source”). 
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which expand the reach of the quality control requirement while 
others refuse to enforce the doctrine.  The varying approaches rep-
resent a serious conflict in trademark law. 
A. Many Courts Now Recognize A Broader Rule 
The quality control requirement undeniably applies to cases of 
assignment in gross and naked licensing.86  In addition, courts are 
now slowly expanding its application to other factual situations.87  
Most significantly, federal courts have held within the last ten 
years that wholesalers of a trademarked product must comply with 
the trademark owner’s quality controls.88  When wholesalers vio-
late this rule, courts protect brand owners who sought to protect 
themselves by attempting to monitor the quality of the goods mar-
keted under their brands.89  Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petro-
leum, Inc.90 and Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Development 
Corp.91 are two recent cases that illustrate this new trend. 
1. The Shell Oil Case 
Shell Oil Co. (“Shell”), a major producer of oil used in trucks, 
routinely licensed its trademarks “Rotella” and “Shell Rotella T” 
to distributors and imposed stringent quality control procedures on 
those licensees.92  Commercial Petroleum, Inc. (“Commercial”), 
the defendant, is an oil wholesaler who sold “Shell Rotella T” oil 
regularly, employing independent quality control methods.93  
Commercial’s controls were lax in comparison to Shell’s rigorous 
 
86. See supra Parts I.A, I.B (setting forth the source and quality control rationales 
of trademark). 
87. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2 (demonstrating how courts are expanding the reach 
of the quality control requirement). 
88. See generally Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3 (2d Cir. 
1996) (holding that the manufacturer was entitled to a preliminary injunction forbidding 
the sale of its product after expiration of the freshness date); Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial 
Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1991) (affirming a preliminary injunction against 
a wholesaler’s unauthorized trademark use). 
89. See Warner-Lambert, 86 F.3d at 7; Shell Oil, 928 F.2d at 107. 
90. 928 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1991). 
91. 86 F.3d 3 (2d Cir. 1996). 
92. See Shell Oil, 928 F.2d at 106. 
93. See id. 
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requirements.94  In addition, Commercial did not have Shell’s per-
mission to disregard Shell’s high standards.95  Shell, therefore, 
brought an action in federal court, based on trademark infringe-
ment and unfair competition law, claiming that Commercial’s ac-
tions caused a likelihood of confusion among consumers of “Shell 
Rotella T” oil.96 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit began its analysis 
by stating that trademark law does not “apply to the sale of genu-
ine goods bearing a true mark, even if the sale is without the mark 
owner’s consent.”97  The court found, however, that trademark law 
did apply in this case because Commercial was selling non-
genuine oil under Shell’s brand name.98  Moreover, Shell’s quality 
control requirements were a part of the product.99  According to 
the court, in order to be considered a genuine product, the oil had 
to pass through Shell’s stringent quality controls.100 
Having found that Commercial was marketing a non-genuine 
product, the court proceeded to address Shell’s claims of trade-
mark infringement and unfair competition.101  It ruled that “[t]he 
use of the Shell marks implies that the product has been delivered 
according to all quality control guidelines enforced by the manu-
facturer.”102  Commercial’s use of the Shell brand on a non-
genuine item could lead prospective buyers to believe that they 
were purchasing a genuine product, and those consumers might be-
lieve that the oil had passed through Shell’s rigorous quality con-
trol standards when, in fact, it had not.103  The court found that 
Commercial had violated Shell’s right to control the quality of the 
goods manufactured and sold under its mark.104 
 
94. See id. 
95. See id. 
96. See id. at 106-07. 
97. Id. at 107. 
98. See id. (“Without Shell’s enforcement of its quality controls, the bulk oil sold 
by Commercial was not truly ‘genuine.’”). 
99. See id. 
100. See id. 
101. See id. at 107-08. 
102. Id. at 108. 
103. See id. at 107. 
104. See id. at 108. 
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Shell Oil reaffirmed the holding of El Greco Leather Products 
Co. v. Shoe World, Inc.,105 in which the court ruled that quality 
control standards are actually a part of the product.106  In Shell Oil, 
the Fourth Circuit recognized that consumers rely on trademarks as 
quality guarantors.107  No matter who is ultimately responsible for 
putting the product into stores, if the good has not passed through 
the brand owner’s quality controls, that product is not genuine.108  
Selling it as if it were genuine is deceitful to consumers.109  Courts 
use the quality control requirement to protect consumers against 
this form of deceit.110 
2. The Warner-Lambert Case 
In Warner-Lambert, the Second Circuit adopted a rationale 
similar to that used in Shell Oil.  Warner-Lambert Co. (“Warner-
Lambert”) sued Quality King, a wholesaler of health and beauty 
aids, to enjoin the sale of Warner-Lambert cough drops sold under 
the brand name “HALLS.”111  Warner-Lambert employed strict 
quality control measures to insure that consumers of “HALLS” 
would not ingest stale cough drops.112  According to Warner-
Lambert, its cough drops became stale thirty months after they 
were produced, and consumers generally consumed a package of 
cough drops within six months after purchase.113  Warner-Lambert, 
therefore, sought to insure that its cough drops would be sold to 
consumers within twenty-four months of production.114 
The Second Circuit identified six ways in which Warner-
Lambert attempted to control the quality of its product, including 
 
105. 806 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986). 
106. See Shell Oil, 928 F.2d at 107 (citing El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe 
World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
107. See id. at 108 (holding that consumers rely on Shell marks as symbols of Shell 
quality). 
108. See El Greco, 806 F.2d at 395-96 (holding that a product is not genuine unless 
it has been through the original manufacturer’s quality controls). 
109. See Shell Oil, 928 F.2d at 108 (holding that the defendant’s use of Shell’s 
mark without adhering to Shell’s quality control standards was deceptive). 
110. See id. (stating that consumers rely on trademarks as symbols of quality). 
111. Id. at 5. 
112. See id. 
113. See id. 
114. See id. 
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shipping the cough drops within eighteen months of production 
and packaging in cases bearing labels stating the expiration 
dates.115  Quality King, however, had subverted Warner-Lambert’s 
attempts at controlling its own product by removing the packages 
of “HALLS” from their original cases and selling them after the 
twenty-four month limit had expired.116  Warner-Lambert sued 
Quality King to enjoin that practice.117 
Quality King, nevertheless, argued that Warner-Lambert failed 
to employ adequate quality control procedures.118  The court found 
that Quality King’s contention could not be sustained because 
Warner-Lambert had the right to make a legitimate business judg-
ment as to the amount of quality control required.119  In addition, 
the court noted that a trademark holder will receive an amount of 
protection for its mark in proportion to the amount of effort it ex-
pends to protect itself.120  The court held that Warner-Lambert had 
demonstrated sufficient effort in protecting itself and that Quality 
King’s actions had devalued Warner-Lambert’s mark.121  Accord-
ingly, the court protected Warner-Lambert’s mark by enjoining 
“HALLS” distribution by Quality King.122 
B. Courts Protect Owners Who Protect Themselves 
Shell Oil and Warner-Lambert demonstrate that courts are be-
ginning to protect trademark owners against wholesalers who sub-
vert or ignore the owners’ quality control standards, as long as 
those owners show a substantial interest in protecting both them-
selves and consumers from the effects of naked licensing and as-
 
115. See id. 
116. See id. 
117. See id. at 5-6. 
118. See id. at 6. 
119. Id. at 7 (holding that “[a] trademark holder is entitled, without losing its right 
to protect what value the mark has, to make a business judgment that additional quality 
control measures would add less value to the mark than their cost”). 
120. See id. (holding that the effectiveness of an owner’s controls is relevant to a 
court’s decision whether to grant protection against a company’s selling non-genuine 
goods under the owner’s mark).  “A company that avails itself of wholly effective proce-
dures will generally be entitled to relief against any measurable sales of non-conforming 
goods.”  Id. 
121. See id. at 7-8. 
122. See id. at 8. 
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signments in gross.123  Conversely, Polymer Technology Corp. v. 
Mimran124 reflects the lack of protection accorded to owners who 
fail to evince a requisite amount of concern for the quality of their 
own products and for the public’s right to rely on the information 
conveyed by trademarks.125 
Polymer Technology Corp. (“Polymer”) manufactured contact 
lens cleaning solution, which it sold under the trademark 
“BOSTON.”126  Polymer employed two different types of packag-
ing, one for retail markets, the other for exclusive distribution to 
eye-care professionals.127  Polymer never sold the professional 
packages to retail stores because those packages did not include a 
list of ingredients, expiration dates, and other information of which 
the general consuming public should be aware.128  Nevertheless, 
Polymer’s contracts with the eye-care professionals did not ex-
pressly prohibit the resale of non-retail packaged “BOSTON” solu-
tion to retail stores.129 
Although defendant Mimran owned a number of stores that 
sold eye-care products, Mimram was not an eye-care professional 
or an authorized dealer of Polymer’s professional packages.130  
Nevertheless, Mimran obtained Polymer’s professional packages 
and resold them to retail stores.131  When Polymer sought to enjoin 
Mimran’s actions, the Second Circuit found that Mimran had not 
violated Polymer’s quality control standards.132 
To prevail on its claim, Polymer would have been required to 
actually have and follow a definite set of quality control require-
ments.133  Thus, the Polymer Technology decision demonstrates 
 
123. See discussion supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2 (analyzing Shell Oil and Warner-
Lambert). 
124. 37 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1994). 
125. See id. 
126. See id. at 77. 
127. See id. 
128. See id.  Polymer sold the professional packages only through authorized deal-
ers.  See id. 
129. See id. 
130. See id. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. at 78. 
133. See id. at 79 (“Because Polymer essentially admits that it did not carefully po-
lice any procedures it may have had in place to ensure that the necessary information ap-
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that courts will not protect owners who do not exhibit adequate in-
terest in shielding themselves from loss of goodwill.  More impor-
tantly, Polymer Technology shows that courts will refuse to rule in 
favor of owners who disregard the safety of consumers by adopt-
ing procedures that result in inadequate labeling.134 
C. Some Courts Do Not Strenuously Enforce the Quality 
Control Requirement 
The holdings in Shell Oil, Warner-Lambert, and Polymer 
Technology demonstrate a trend toward a stronger, broader quality 
control requirement in trademark law.135  Some courts, however, 
do not enforce the rule, and, in fact, find ways to circumvent it.136  
One commentator in particular maintains that the quality control 
requirement is useless for this reason, hence should be eliminated 
as a doctrine in trademark law.137 
One commentator in particular, Kevin Parks, challenges the 
utility of both the quality control requirement and the more general 
quality assurance theory of trademark law.138  Parks argues that its 
elimination “would not require wholesale changes in existing law,” 
partly because courts rarely enforce it.139  Although no court has 
actually denounced the quality control requirement, some courts 
have reduced its effectiveness by imposing a heavy burden of 
proof on parties seeking to show that a trademark owner has not 
met the requirement.140 
 
peared on Polymer’s packaging, we do not find Mimran’s retail distribution of the pro-
fessional kits . . . a violation of Polymer’s own quality control standards.”). 
134. See id. 
135. See supra Parts II.A.1-2, II.B (analyzing the Shell Oil, Warner-Lambert, and 
Polymer Tech. decisions). 
136. See Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Ryu, 960 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1992). 
137. See infra text accompanying notes 138-139 (outlining Parks’ arguments). 
138. See Parks, supra note 15, at 535. 
139. See id. at 568. 
140. See id. at 541 (arguing that courts place a “nearly insurmountable” burden on 
parties seeking to show abandonment through lack of adequate quality controls); see also 
Embedded Moments, Inc. v. International Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) 
(finding that a trademark license agreement need not include an explicit provision for 
quality control as long as the licensor retains actual control, and holding the licensor to a 
minimal standard of proof in showing such control). 
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A typical example is Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Ryu,141 in 
which Moore Business Forms (“Moore”) registered the name 
“Compurite” as a trademark for its business.142  Approximately ten 
years later, Ryu began to use the name “CompuRite” in the Hous-
ton market.143  When Moore sued for trademark infringement, Ryu 
argued in defense that Moore had abandoned its mark by licensing 
“Compurite” to another company without providing for quality 
controls.144  But the Fifth Circuit held that Moore had not issued a 
naked license.145  The court found that “[b]ecause a finding of in-
sufficient control essentially signals involuntary trademark aban-
donment and works a forfeiture . . . the proponent of a naked li-
cense theory ‘faces a stringent standard’ of proof.”146  
Consequently, the court held that “there need not be formal quality 
control where ‘the particular circumstances of the licensing ar-
rangement [indicate] that the public will not be deceived.’”147 
Moore Business Forms and similar cases dilute the strength of 
the quality control requirement, making the analysis appear purely 
ad hoc.148  For this reason, Parks and other critics call into question 
the efficacy of the entire doctrine.149  With the existence of such 
disparate holdings as Shell Oil and Moore Business Forms, courts 
must re-define the quality control requirement to ensure consis-
tency and predictability within the law.150  The main question is 
whether the policy behind the Lanham Act supports either the ex-
pansion or the elimination of the entire doctrine.151 
 
141. 960 F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying a “stringent standard of proof” on 
the party seeking a judicial finding of abandonment (citing Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. 
Two Pesos, Inc. 932 F.2d 1113, 1121 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted in part, 502 U.S. 
1071, aff’d, 505 U.S. 1071 (1992))). 
142. See id. at 488. 
143. See id. 
144. See id. at 489. 
145. See id. 
146. Id. (quoting Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1121). 
147. Id. (quoting Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1121). 
148. See Parks, supra note 15, at 540 (stating that the quality control requirement is 
elusive and maintaining that an “objective standard of quality control is futile”). 
149. See id. 
150. See supra notes 88-110, 141-147 and accompanying text (setting forth the 
holdings in Shell Oil and Moore). 
151. See infra note 222 and accompanying text (setting forth the purpose of the 
Lanham Act). 
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III. THE QUALITY CONTROL REQUIREMENT SHOULD APPLY TO ALL 
TRADEMARK OWNERS 
In enforcing the quality control requirement, there is no sound 
reason for courts to distinguish between trademark owners who as-
sign or license their marks and those who do not.  Consumers will 
suffer equivalent injuries whenever they buy goods that fluctuate 
in quality, regardless of whether they purchase them directly from 
the trademark owner or from the owner’s licensee.  Accordingly, 
this part argues that the quality control requirement should be ap-
plied to all trademark holders because quality control is essential 
to trademark law and serves the same basic principles as the trade-
mark system as a whole. 
A. The “Dual Role” Is Actually A Single Function 
The traditional view of trademarks as indicators of both prod-
uct source and quality misconstrues the true value of the trademark 
system and fails to recognize how consumers utilize brands.152  A 
brand name really carries only one message: The buyer will re-
ceive exactly what he has been led expect by way of advertise-
ments, past experiences, and word of mouth.153  That message is 
known as the brand’s goodwill.154 
Trademarks undoubtedly act as indicators of source.155  Al-
though modern consumers do not have personal relationships with 
the manufacturers of the goods they buy, they rely on trademarks 
as general indicators of what entities made certain items.156  Once 
consumers discover a product that they like, they become repeat 
buyers, using the trademark information as an assurance that they 
will receive exactly the same item each time they purchase the 
 
152. See Hanak, supra note 16, at 363 (asserting that trademarks serve the dual pur-
pose of identifying both the source and quality of the goods to which they are affixed). 
153. See id. at 363-64. 
154. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (defining the term “goodwill”). 
155. See Schechter, supra note 4, at 813-14. 
156. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1997) (defining the term “trademark” as “any 
word, name, symbol, or device” that identifies or distinguishes the goods to which it is 
affixed from those goods sold by others and to “indicate the source of the goods, even if 
that source is unknown”). 
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goods marketed under the familiar brand name.157  Manufacturers 
achieve consistency in the quality of their products through uni-
formity in the production process, and the monitoring of the that 
manufacturing system is known as quality control.158  Thus, the 
quality control requirement must apply to all trademark owners to 
avoid fluctuation in product quality because absent such a broad 
doctrine. the source information that trademarks provide will not 
guarantee consumers that they will receive genuine products. 
Courts and most trademark theorists agree that, in addition to 
acting as source indicators, trademarks also signify the quality of a 
product.159  The specific quality level of an item is immaterial, as 
long as it remains consistent.160  Consumers do not always want 
the highest quality products; they merely seek consistency and 
predictability.161  For this reason, unfair competition law contains 
provisions protecting against false representations.162  Trademarks 
employed in advertising may not misrepresent the products which 
they identify.163  Fluctuation in product quality is analogous to 
misrepresentation because the mark will tell consumers that they 
will receive one thing when, in reality, they are likely to receive 
something of a lesser quality. 
Consumers do not think in terms of trademarks acting as “indi-
cator of source” and “indicator of quality,” they only want to know 
 
157. See Hanak, supra note 16, at 364 (explaining that consumers do not care about 
the exact source of the products they buy).  Hanak writes that “a consumer wishes to 
match a trademark with what he likes and dislikes.  If the origin of a product is of con-
cern to a consumer, it is only because the manufacturer’s products have come to be asso-
ciated with a certain level of quality.”  Id. 
158. See By-Rite Distrib., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 577 F. Supp. 530, 536 (D. Utah 
1983) (“The quality control standards adopted . . . are designed to maintain the consistent 
quality of bottled soft drinks and are therefore essential in protecting the goodwill and 
trademarks”). 
159. See Hanak, supra note 16, at 363 (stating that “[t]oday virtually every writer 
on trademark law accepts the quality assurance function”). 
160. See El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (indicating that the “actual quality of the goods is irrelevant; it is the control 
of quality that a trademark holder is entitled to maintain”). 
161. See supra note 50 (quoting Professor McCarthy). 
162. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (West 1997) (prohibiting use of language in 
commercial advertising that misrepresents the goods or services in connection with the 
purposes for which the goods or services are used). 
163. See id. 
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what they are buying.164  A mark with little or no goodwill is use-
less to consumers.165  A strong brand, by contrast, immediately in-
dicates both the source and the quality of the product.166  This in-
formation reduces consumer search costs, which is why strong 
marks deserve heightened protection.  It is also why a mark that no 
longer serves its purpose should be deemed to be abandoned under 
the terms of the Lanham Act.  Courts ought to find that the owners 
have abandoned their marks in those cases, regardless of whether 
or not any licensing agreements or assignments exist. 
B. The Quality Control Requirement Is Consistent with the 
Purposes of Trademark Law 
Trademark law is generally designed to serve three basic pur-
poses.167  The driving force behind every court’s decision regard-
ing trademarks is an implicit desire to serve at least one of three 
policies: (1) the protection of goodwill, (2) the avoidance of con-
sumer confusion, and (3) the preservation and/or creation of inter-
brand competition.168  Courts can support each of these trademark 
policies and bolster the entire system of unfair competition law by 
perpetuating a stronger quality control requirement that applies to 
all trademark owners. 
1. The Protection of Goodwill 
Professor Hansen’s first policy of trademark law is the protec-
tion of goodwill.169  Courts and the Lanham Act treat the use of a 
 
164. See Hanak, supra note 16, at 364 (asserting that consumers rarely know or 
care about the exact source of the products they buy); see also supra Parts I.B, I.C (dis-
cussing the terms “indicator of source” and “indicator of quality”). 
165. See supra note 10 (stating that a trademark cannot be separated from its good-
will without destroying the utility of the trademark). 
166. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (explaining how trademarks perform 
an “economizing function” by reducing consumer search costs). 
167. See interview with Hugh C. Hansen, Professor, Fordham University School of 
Law, in New York, N.Y. (Apr. 3, 1998) [hereinafter Hansen interview] (on file with the 
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal). 
168. See id. 
169. See id.; accord 135 CONG. REC. H1207, H1215 (daily ed., April 13, 1989) 
[hereinafter Kastenmeier statement] (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (“For businesses, 
trademarks are a kind of badge of honor, and it is important that their investments in 
those marks be protected.”). 
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trademark as creating property and concomitant rights.170  Such a 
perspective is similar to John Locke’s labor theory,171 which states 
essentially that whatever a person creates with his own labor is 
rightfully his.172  Courts, in the same way, provide greater protec-
tion to trademark owners who expend substantial effort in advertis-
ing and other forms of consumer education, to generate goodwill 
for their brands.173 
Goodwill, nevertheless, is not static property which, once de-
veloped, remains perpetually; trademark owners must actively 
maintain their brands’ goodwill or risk losing protection for their 
marks.174  Thus, the owner must maintain the quality of the product 
which the brand represents.175 
 
170. See Kastenmeier statement, supra note 169. 
171. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 18-19 (C.B. Mac-
Pherson ed., Hackett Publishing 1980) (1690). 
172. See id. at 19.  According to Locke: 
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every 
man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but him-
self.  The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are prop-
erly his.  Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath pro-
vided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something 
that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.  It being by him removed 
from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour some-
thing annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this la-
bour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have 
a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as 
good, left in common for others. 
Id. 
173. See Vitarroz Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1981) (affirming the 
district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit for trademark infringement where Vitarroz 
was the senior user of BRAVO’S and Borden began to sell similar products under the 
name BRAVOS).  In reaching its decision, the court focused on the fact that Borden had 
spent “in excess of $1.3 million in developing goodwill for its BRAVOS chips,” while 
the senior user’s “expenses in introducing [BRAVO’S] were approximately $13,000.”  
Id. at 962; see also Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. 
Md. 1988) (holding that Quality Inns deliberately attempted to benefit by the goodwill 
and reputation of McDonald’s, whose family of marks rank among the strongest).  In its 
analysis, the court found that “McDonald’s spends almost a billion dollars each year on 
marketing and advertising.”  Id. at 212. 
174. See supra Part I.C (defining abandonment in trademark law). 
175. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (explaining that maintenance of 
product quality promotes goodwill for the brand that represents the particular item and 
for the trademark system as a whole). 
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If a consumer repeatedly buys a product based on past favor-
able experiences with it and receives merchandise of the expected 
character and quality each time, the goodwill of the mark in-
creases.176  In addition, the consumer is likely to continue this pur-
chasing pattern.177  When a brand’s owner allows the quality of its 
product to fluctuate, however, that owner loses the goodwill in the 
mark.178  Consumers will wind up buying non-genuine goods.179  
Moreover, consumers’ needs will likely go unsatisfied because the 
quality of the non-genuine items is not of the expected level.180 
Selling non-genuine goods in a manner that makes them appear 
to be genuine is deceptive and drains the goodwill from a mark.181  
Should the fluctuation in quality persist to the extent that consum-
ers cannot rely on the brand to represent what they will receive 
upon purchase, courts must find that the trademark has been aban-
doned under the Lanham Act.182  This rule would force all trade-
mark owners to police the quality of their products or risk losing 
protection for the property they worked to create.183 
Although critics may assert that the market will correct the 
 
176. See supra text accompanying note 40 (describing how a trademark grows in 
strength). 
177. See supra text accompanying note 39 (explaining how trademarks effect the 
purchasing patterns of consumers). 
178. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 8 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(“Bad experiences by concentrations of consumers can lead to communications that mu-
tually reinforce negative impressions about a mark and cause substantial numbers of con-
sumers and chains to cease purchasing products using the mark.”). 
179. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing genuine and non-
genuine goods). 
180. See Warner-Lambert, 86 F.2d at 6 (indicating that the distribution of a sub-par 
product under a trademark may tarnish the image of that mark); cf. JANE C. GINSBURG ET 
AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 760-61 (2d ed., Michie 1996) (noting 
that tarnishment is the reduction in a trademark’s “goodwill through its association with 
unsavory unrelated goods or services”). 
181. See Warner-Lambert, 86 F.3d at 6 (holding that the distribution of non-
genuine goods constitutes trademark infringement). 
182. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75 (examining the holding in Dawn 
Donut that a trademark owner’s failure to control the quality of the products marketed 
under its brand by a licensee will result in a court finding that the trademark holder has 
abandoned its mark). 
183. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (illustrating how courts already use 
the Lanham Act as a means of punishing naked licensors, who, by definition, do not po-
lice the quality of their products). 
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problems that arise from a manufacturer’s indifference to quality 
control, that contention ignores the fact that the market, at best, 
will be slow to respond to this occurrence.184  There is a significant 
lag time between the point at which the quality of the owner’s 
goods begins to fluctuate and the point at which enough consumers 
would cease purchasing the goods.185  During that time lag, con-
sumers are deceived again and again, while the careless trademark 
owner continues to profit at their expense.186 
2. The Avoidance of Consumer Confusion 
From an economic perspective, the greatest benefit of trade-
marks is their ability to reduce consumer search costs.187  Trade-
marks allow the consumer to simply ask for the desired product by 
name, rather than having to describe it in an effort to set it apart 
from similar products made by other companies.188  Brand names 
allow the consumer to instantly identify the item he is searching 
for, instead of hoping that, through the inefficient process of trial 
and error, he will stumble upon the item he wants.189  Consumers 
employing the trial and error method risk obtaining unsatisfactory 
products made by competitors.190 
A trademark effectively reduces consumer search costs only if 
it accurately represents the item the consumer expects to receive 
when purchasing the good based on its name.191  Thus, a brand 
name will be ineffective in reducing consumer search costs if, be-
cause of lack of quality control, it inaccurately represents the item 
 
184. See supra text accompanying note 78 (stating that consumers will be deceived 
repeatedly before the market can adjust to the harm caused by the non-genuine products 
sent into the market by naked licensors and their licensees). 
185. See supra text accompanying note 78 (maintaining that consumers will be 
harmed during the period of market adjustment). 
186. See supra note 77 (discussing the effect of naked licensing on the public and 
the need to prevent misuses of trademarks). 
187. See Landes & Posner, supra note 41, at 268-70 (stating that brand names serve 
an economizing role, allowing the consumer to quickly identify the desired product and 
allowing the seller to convey information through the brand name). 
188. See id. (citing John F. Coverdale, Trademarks and Generic Words: An Effect-
On-Competition Test, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 868 (1984)). 
189. See id. 
190. See id. 
191. See id. 
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that the consumer is buying.192  The trademark system relies on 
consumer trust; consumers must be able to depend on a name as 
the indicator of what product they will receive.193  Once the public 
can no longer trust brands to indicate product quality, trademarks 
become useless.194 
3. The Preservation of Interbrand Competition 
Critics of the quality control requirement may contend that the 
doctrine interferes with interbrand competition by setting a product 
quality standard that small manufacturers will be unable to sat-
isfy.195  As a result, courts that insist on the maintenance of consis-
tent quality will exclude smaller companies from competing in the 
market.196  This argument, however, misconceives what the quality 
control requirement actually is and, therefore, does not make an ef-
fective case against the preservation and broadening of the rule.197 
The quality control requirement does not purport to impose a 
minimum standard on a product’s quality; its only function is to 
assure consumers that today’s experience with the trademarked 
product today will be comparable to their past experience with the 
product, or to the reports they heard about that product from fellow 
consumers.198  As long as purchasers can rely on the brand in this 
fashion, the trademark system is serving its purpose.199  Quality 
control promotes that purpose by enhancing consumers’ ability to 
 
192. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining that consumer search 
costs rise when a brand name does not accurately represent the true nature of the items 
sold under that name). 
193. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (stating that the quality control re-
quirement builds consumer trust in the entire trademark system). 
194. See supra note 41 (quoting Professor Landes and Judge Posner, who stated 
that the true value of trademarks is in their ability to reduce consumer search costs, 
which is not possible if consumers do not have faith in the system.). 
195. See generally Parks, supra note 15, at 531-68 (setting forth various arguments 
in favor of the abolition of the quality control requirement). 
196. See id. 
197. See id. 
198. See Landes & Posner, supra note 41, at 269 (“[A] trademark conveys informa-
tion that allows the consumer to say . . . ‘I need not investigate the attributes of the brand 
I am about to purchase because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the 
attributes are the same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier.’”). 
199. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (declaring the general purposes 
that trademarks serve). 
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accurately predict what product they will receive in return for their 
money.200 
C. Courts Must Require All Trademark Owners To Maintain 
Consistent Product Quality 
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc.201 and other such 
cases address issues of quality control only where a trademark has 
been licensed or assigned, rather than in all trademark cases.202  
Although trademark owners who do not license or assign their 
marks should be subject to the same standards of quality control as 
those who do,203 courts have drawn an arbitrary bright line on this 
issue.204  Under this bright-line test, the legal analysis turns on 
whether or not a trademark owner has licensed or assigned its mark 
to a third party, rather than whether that owner has sought to main-
tain consistency in the quality of its products.205 
A leading commentator asserts that the arbitrary nature of the 
distinction between trademark licensors and non-licensors “ex-
poses a basic flaw in the control requirement that has never been 
adequately addressed.”206  That assertion is an understatement: The 
unreasonable disparity is more than a “basic” flaw in the quality 
control requirement; it is the central flaw.  If the goal of quality 
control is to protect consumers from being deceived when they 
purchase a product, the focus of the quality control doctrine should 
 
200. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (stating that the quality control 
requirement insures that products put into the market by licensees have been manufac-
tured according to the licensor’s guidelines and that the quality of those items is, there-
fore, predictable). 
201. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).  See discussion supra Part I.C.3 (describing the 
Dawn Donut decision). 
202. See Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 367 (“Clearly the only effective way to protect 
the public where a trademark is used by licensees is to place on the licensor the affirma-
tive duty of policing in a reasonable manner the activities of his licensees.”). 
203. See Parks, supra note 15, at 536 (stating that “the fundamental problem with 
the quality control requirement is that it forces inconsistent treatment of licensing and 
non-licensing trademark owners”). 
204. See id. 
205. See supra text accompanying note 3 (identifying the quality control require-
ment as a doctrine specific to the law of trademark assignment and licensing, not a rule 
of trademark law in general). 
206. See Parks, supra note 15, at 536. 
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be on the final product that a company places in the market—not 
on whether the factory that made the product belonged to the ac-
tual trademark owner or a licensee.207  The licensed or non-
licensed status of a trademarked product is immaterial because the 
end result is the same: consumer deception, increased search costs, 
and the public’s loss of faith in the trademark system.208 
One proposed solution to the arbitrary license/non-license dis-
tinction is to eliminate the entire quality control requirement and 
allow the market to guide a trademark owner’s decisions concern-
ing maintenance of product quality.209  That proposal ignores the 
probability that the market will be slow to correct itself.210  During 
that time lag, consumers would continue to purchase products, 
consistently receive non-genuine goods, and, subsequently, lose 
faith in the system.211 
Fortunately, courts are unlikely to abruptly discard an entire 
legal doctrine in the way that Parks suggests.212  The problem of 
disparate treatment in the area of quality control could be resolved 
in a much less drastic manner by simply broadening the require-
ment to apply uniformly to all trademark owners.213  The proper 
focus is on consumer protection; courts cannot allow trademark 
owners to market non-genuine goods under their brands and, at the 
same time, provide protection for those trademark owners against 
infringement from competitors.214  Consumer deception is unac-
 
207. See id. 
208. See id. 
209. See Parks, supra note 15, at 537-38 (“[T]here is no legitimate reason for im-
posing additional quality control obligations on licensors, or for exposing a licensed 
mark to the risk of ‘abandonment’ if the quality levels of licensed goods are inconsistent 
or consistently poor.”). 
210. See supra text accompanying note 78 (stating that consumers will be deceived 
repeatedly during the time it takes for the market to correct itself). 
211. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining that quality control 
builds consumer trust in the system and that a lack of quality control will reduce that col-
lective faith.). 
212. See generally United States v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1955) 
(discussing the effect of stare decisis in deciding subsequent cases). 
213. Kevin Parks hypothesized a solution that is diametrically opposed to this the-
ory: The complete abolition of the quality control doctrine.  See supra notes 83-84 and 
accompanying text (calling for the elimination of the quality control requirement). 
214. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (tracing the history of trade-
marks as providing the purchasing public with a means of redress against the manufac-
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ceptable, and courts may not promote it.215  All trademark owners 
must be held to the same standard: Produce goods of consistent 
quality or lose protection for their marks.216 
Clearly defining the function of trademarks is a critical prior-
ity.  Courts have thus far declared only that trademark holders have 
the right to control the quality of the goods sold under their 
marks,217 but that formulation of the law is not strong enough.  
Trademark licensors should have an obligation to consumers to in-
sure that their products are genuine.218  The quality of a good is 
undisputedly an integral feature of the product.219  For example, a 
Honda Civic that buyers would consider a “lemon” due to faulty 
assembly obviously is not the same product as a Honda Civic that 
operates properly.  No consumer would consider such a dangerous 
machine to be the genuine car he intended to purchase.220  That 
buyer did not purchase the name; he bought the automobile be-
cause of the goodwill in the name.221 
A broader application of the requirement would be consistent 
 
turer of a certain product in the event those consumers purchase defective goods). 
215. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (illustrating a rule devised to 
prevent the harm caused by consumer deception). 
216. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (arguing that the fact that the qual-
ity control requirement, as applied by courts, treats trademark licensors differently than 
trademark owners that do not license their marks is a flaw in the doctrine). 
217. See El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395 (“One 
of the most valuable and important protections afforded by the Lanham Act is the right to 
control the quality of the goods manufactured and sold under the holder’s trademark.”). 
218. See Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 409 (5th Cir. 
1962) (holding that the licensor “had an affirmative duty to itself and to the public to in-
voke some kind of control and restraint upon its various licensees to prevent losing its 
property rights thereunder”); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 
367 (2d Cir. 1959) (“Clearly the only effective way to protect the public where a trade-
mark is used by licensees is to place on the licensor the affirmative duty of policing in a 
reasonable manner the activities of his licensees.”); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:50 
(“The licensor owes an affirmative duty to the public to assure that in the hands of his 
licensee the trademark continues to represent that which it purports to represent.”). 
219. See Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104, 107 (4th Cir. 
1991) (holding that the “quality control standards were an integral part of the . . . product 
identified by the marks”). 
220. See supra note 7 (defining the term “genuine” as applied to trademarked 
goods). 
221. See supra note 10 (stating that a brand name is inseparable from that brand’s 
goodwil). 
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with the public’s use of trademarks.222  Professor Schechter theo-
rized that “the trademark is not merely a symbol of goodwill but 
often the most effective agent for the creation of goodwill, imprint-
ing upon the public’s mind an anonymous and impersonal guaranty 
of satisfaction, creating a desire for further satisfactions.”223  A 
court’s finding of abandonment, therefore, is proper whenever any 
trademark owner allows the quality of its products to fluctuate.224  
By allowing product quality to lapse, that owner reneges on its 
guaranty of satisfaction.225 
A problem with any trademark abandonment ruling is that the 
brand’s goodwill remains in the market for anyone to exploit with-
out fear of judicial interference, thereby opening the door to future 
consumer deception.226  Although critics of a strong quality control 
requirement argue that this mandates an alternate solution,227 the 
fear of this sort of rampant consumer confusion is not realistic.  
The same problem could arise in assignment in gross and naked li-
censing cases, where courts already apply the quality control 
rule.228 
There is no reason for the disparate treatment of licensing and 
non-licensing trademark owners; a quality control violation carries 
such a draconian punishment—loss of trademark protection—that 
few trademark owners would risk violating the rule.229  The 
stronger the brand, the greater the potential injury to a brand owner 
 
222. See Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 672 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(analyzing the purposes of the Lanham Act, one of which is the protection of consumers 
who purchase products based on their trademarks). 
223. Schechter, supra note 4, at 819. 
224. See supra notes 34-35 (explaining how a trademark owner’s failure to super-
vise the manufacturing process of a product can cause a court to rule that the trademark 
owner has abandoned the brand under which he markets that particular product). 
225. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (discussing how trademarks act 
as guarantors of satisfaction). 
226. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (setting forth the rules for trademark 
abandonment under § 45 of the Lanham Act). 
227. See, e.g., Parks, supra note 15, at 531-68 (arguing for the abolition of the qual-
ity control requirement). 
228. See supra Parts I.C.1, I.C.2 (setting forth the rules against assignment in gross 
and naked licensing). 
229. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (establishing the punishment for 
quality control violations). 
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upon a finding of abandonment.  A trademark holder who cares 
about his business will be certain to meet the quality control re-
quirement once courts apply it to all owners.230  The risk of mas-
sive amounts of unprotected goodwill floating in the marketplace 
is, therefore, de minimis. 
CONCLUSION 
The trademark system is based on trust between the public and 
trademark holders.  A mark gains goodwill as that trust develops 
through consumers’ repeat-buying of genuine items produced and 
distributed under the quality control of the brand owner.  Consum-
ers are deceived when a non-genuine good appears in the market 
under a brand name.  Shoppers become frustrated.  Some even suf-
fer serious injuries from products that were expected to work prop-
erly but turned out to have dangerous defects.  If consumers re-
peatedly receive non-genuine goods, they will lose faith in the 
system, and the entire trademark system will crumble because it 
will no longer reduce consumer search costs. 
Based on this analysis, courts must continue to protect and 
strengthen the quality control requirement by applying it to all 
trademark owners, regardless of whether or not they assign or li-
cense their marks to third parties.  The courts must employ the 
quality control requirement as a tool to punish trademark owners 
who injure the public by allowing the quality of their goods to 
fluctuate.  Absent such judicial action, the trademark system will 
fail to serve one of its purposes, namely, reducing consumer search 
costs by using brands to represent consistent levels of product 
quality. 
 
230. See id. 
